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ABSTRACT 
While it is fortunate that the National Airspace System (NAS) has achieved levels of 
safety unparalleled in almost any other domain, commensurate levels of risk are so low as to be 
very difficult to assess. This difficulty can be represented from two different-but-corresponding 
viewpoints: statistical concerns with estimating very rare events, and modeling concerns with 
estimating very rare events. The statistical concerns stem from the sheer number of data points 
required to perform a truly random Monte Carlo-type simulation (order of 101 0), and the novel 
analyses that would be required to form estimates not of 'mean' values, but instead of 
occurrences in the 'tails' of probability distributions of a priori unknown form. The modeling 
concerns stem from the difficulty in capturing all the behaviors of every agent in the system and 
all types of interactions between them such that every possible 'real' behavior is captured. 
This proposal instead seeks to coordinate the statistical and modeling concerns using an 
intermediate model fidelity: agent-based simulation of relevant aspects of the NAS. Agent-based 
simulation of the National Airspace System (NAS) provides a detailed prediction of system 
behavior. Both micro-level (agent) and macro-level (system-wide) behaviors are simulated 
simultaneously, highlighting system-wide issues arising from a change in NAS configuration, air 
traffic procedures, or air or ground technologies - as well as identifying unreasonable demands that 
system dynamics may place on individual agents such as controllers or pilots. 
Prior developments established such detailed simulations using human performance 
models as the pilot and controller agents. Corresponding developments in simulation 
architectures also demonstrated the ability to accurately model agent interactions, to enable 
larger scale simulations via distributing the simulation, and to facilitate tighter linkages with the 
statistical issues with data collection and with establishing sufficient confidence in output 
parameters. 
This report describes the following research tasks further developing agent-based 
simulation as a method for NAS risk assessment: 
• Closer integration (working with San Jose State University) of human performance models with 
agent-based simulations, so that they can work seamlessly together. 
• Implementation of a large-scale agent-based simulation of an aspect of the NAS suitable for 
assessing safety issues at sufficient level of detail to identify the likely impact of hazards 
resulting from specific conditions, and to highlight their source and potential solutions. 
• A two-stage analysis process, one using very detailed agent-models for a lower number of 
simulation runs, and the second using less detailed agent models for a high number of data runs 
suitable for statistical analysis. 
• Supporting research into data analysis techniques and large-scale simulation techniques. 
A specific test case (analyzing aircraft arrivals into LAX using a variety of spacing 
techniques) was examined throughout as a test case. It should be noted, however, that the over­
arching purpose of this work was to provide the research and development base for NAS risk 
assessment, not to provide a single risk assessment of this one test case. 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While it is fortunate that the National Airspace System (NAS) has achieved levels of 
safety unparalleled in almost any other domain, its commensurate low levels of risk are very 
difficult to assess. This can be represented from two different-but-corresponding viewpoints: 
statistical concerns with estimating very rare events, and modeling concerns with creating the 
vast number of behaviors that could create them. The statistical concerns stem from the sheer 
number of data points required to perform a truly random Monte Carlo-type simulation (order of 
101 0), and the novel analyses required to form estimates not of 'mean' values, but instead of 
occurrences in the 'tails' of probability distributions unknown a priori. The modeling concerns 
stem from the difficulty in capturing all the behaviors of every agent in the system and all types 
of interactions between them such that every possible 'real' behavior is captured in a simulation. 
Historically, approaches to NASA risk assessment have focused either on the statistical 
concerns or on the modeling concerns. When statistical methods were emphasized, very 
aggregate, low fidelity models were used, such as fault trees; while the statistical processes 
deriving the result could be verified, the accuracy of the underlying model was often based on 
expert opinion and approximations, and the source of and solution to a safety issue could not be 
robustly identified. When high fidelity models were emphasized, very few number of data points 
could be collected. For example, human-in-the-loop simulations of entire air traffic centers have 
been enacted, but they could not provide data about more than a few hours of operations. 
This project instead sought to unify the statistical and modeling concerns using an 
intermediate level of model fidelity: agent-based simulation of relevant aspects of the NAS. 
Earlier developments established such detailed simulations using human performance models as 
the pilot and controller agents. Corresponding developments in simulation architectures 
accurately model;ed agent interactions, enabled larger scale simulations via distributing the 
simulation, and facilitated tighter linkages with the statistical issues with data collection and with 
establishing sufficient confidence in output parameters. 
This report describes a series of research tasks conducted, in concert with San Jose State 
University, towards developing agent-based simulation as a method for NAS risk assessment. A 
specific test case (analyzing aircraft arrivals into LAX using a variety of spacing techniques) was 
examined throughout as a demonstration. The report concludes with the work's anticipated 
impact and directions for further research. 
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BACKGROUND 
Agent-Based Simulation of the NAS 
Analysis of large-scale complex systems, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), 
requires the use of hybrid agent-based simulation. Simulation is an important tool for evaluating 
the performance of systems, and provides a safe and cost-effective way of examining the impact 
of potential changes. Typically, large-scale complex systems include different types of entities 
whose interactions are as important to overall system performance as the behavior of the entities 
taken in isolation. For instance, the NAS can be defined as a collection of mutually dependent 
entities, such as aircraft, controllers, pilots, ground systems, and communication, navigation and 
surveillance technologies; many of these entities act as intelligent agents responding to their 
environment. The overall behavior of the NAS - and its safety - is thereby created as an 
emergent behavior of these agents in the context of their environment. 
The individual behavior of these different entities and overall behavior of the NAS, 
therefore, can be modeled by a combination of agent models, environment models, and their 
interactions. This is a departure from traditional methods of simulating the NAS, which have 
largely been based on discrete-event models and have often been limited to specific applications, 
types of analyses or parts of the NAS. 1 , 2 
Several difficulties needed to be overcome in implementing an agent-based simulation of 
the NAS. The most-studied element focuses on modeling the various entities within the NAS; 
for example, detailed and validated models have been created of human performance in work 
environments and of vehicle dynamics.3'4 
Software Architecture 
Prior research at Georgia Tech and within the Aviation Safety Program has 
complimented the development of detailed agent models by developing a simulation software 
architecture with the following capabilities: 
1. To accept different types of models with varying fidelity without placing unnecessary 
restrictions on the types of models; 
2. To allow for easy reconfiguration of the simulation through the addition of new agent models 
to define scenarios through plain-text script files; 
3. To control the timing of the agents in a computationally efficient manner when running 
within the architecture in a single processor; and 
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4. To handle interactions between entities within the system. 
Capabilities 1 and 4 were created by the use of an object-oriented analysis and design 
approach in adapting the original Reconfigurable Flight Simulator (RFS) architecture to agent-
based simulation of the NAS. 5 ' 6 This architecture establishes base standard interfaces for agents 
(by which they can access the shared simulation environment, including timing controls, data-
passing mechanisms, and environment models and databases), and a mechanism for extending 
their interface in the simulation (termed the Object Data/Methods Extension [OD/ME]). Agents 
meeting these interfaces and the OD/ME protocol can be entered into the simulation environment 
and configured by calling plain-text scripts. Capabilities 3 and 4 were resolved through 
development of novel within-processor timing schemes, in which agents are free to update 
independently of each other at their own rate (preventing unnecessary calls to agents) until times 
where they need to be synchronized with other agent(s) for an interaction or for a measurement 
of system behavior. 
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Figure 1. RFS Architecture Control Structure, With Linkages Between CEM and Vehicle 
Agents, I/O Objects, and the ECAD; Networking and Timing Objects Have Access to All 
5 
Simulating Interacting Agents Within and Across Networks 
To further extend the utility of agent-based simulation of the NAS, preliminary efforts 
created networked simulations with heterogeneous agent models (i.e., including agents that are 
not executed with the RFS architecture, but instead control their own timing and processes, and 
interact with the larger simulation through data-passing across the network). Networking 
interfaces have been implemented using the High-Level Architecture (HLA), a Department of 
Defense standard for distributed simulation, which provided the Run-Time Interfaces (RTTs) for 
networking protocols. In one specific implementation, working with San Jose State University 
and ATAC Corp., the RFS was networked to the human performance model MIDAS, which 
provided detailed models of the behavior of an air traffic controller and pilots engaged in 
activities of interest; the RFS provided models of the 'procedure-following humans' (i.e., up­
stream and down-stream controllers, and pilots not engaged in activities of interest), as well as 
relevant communication and surveillance technologies, aircraft dynamic models, and a shared 
simulation environment providing an atmospheric turbulence model and a navigation database.7 
These efforts to date may be considered a success for their demonstration of linking 
heterogeneous simulations (including detailed human performance models) together into an 
agent-based simulation of a fundamental component of the NAS. However, this endeavor also 
highlighted the need for further reliance on networked, distributed simulations (sometimes called 
federated simulation systems). This simulation configuration is an increasingly popular 
approach to realizing scalable agent-based simulations of large, complex systems. These 
simulation systems are constructed by interconnecting autonomous agent-models executing on 
different computers that are connected via a network. Scalability is achieved in the sense that 
one can increase the number of agents and the number of computers to model larger and/or more 
complex systems, such as modeling larger segments of the NAS or including more agents for 
higher fidelity simulations. This technology enables one to leverage prior investments in 
simulation software by reusing rather than re-inventing simulators for elements of a system. It is 
particularly well-suited for modeling the NAS because simulators already exist that model key 
elements, such as the aforementioned MIDAS and RFS. Distributed simulation has been 
successfully employed in domains such as Defense (e.g., interconnecting flight and vehicle 
simulators to create virtual battlefields for training), as exemplified by recent efforts such as the 
HLA. Some work in applying this concept to aviation simulations has also been completed. 
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Using Large-Scale Simulations for Risk Assessment 
General Issues with Risk Assessment of the National Airspace System 
While it is fortunate that the National Airspace System has achieved levels of safety 
unparalleled in almost any other domain (with the notable exception of nuclear power), 
commensurate levels of risk are so low as to be very difficult to assess. This difficulty can be 
represented from two different-but-corresponding viewpoints: statistical concerns with 
estimating very rare events, and modeling concerns with estimating very rare events. The 
statistical concerns stem from the sheer number of data points that would be required to perform 
a truly random Monte Carlo-type simulation (order of 101 0), and the novel analyses that would be 
required to form estimates not of 'mean' values, but instead of occurrences in the 'tails' of 
probability distributions of a priori unknown form. The modeling concerns stem from the 
difficulty in capturing all the behaviors of every agent in the system and all types of interactions 
between them such that every possible 'real' behavior is captured in a simulation. 
While sufficient number of runs of a purely-modeled, perfectly random simulation can 
not be achieved for classic Monte Carlo-type methods of risk assessment, a carefully coordinated 
and staged process can provide more insight into the sources and frequencies of the most 
important hazards. Specifically: 
• First, a 'hazard analysis' can be performed. When using simulation, this can be based on a 
low number of simulation runs using comparatively high-fidelity models; other processes for 
risk assessment may instead use expert opinions and various model forms such as fault tree 
analysis, etc. The result of this first process is identification of the most relevant (i.e., 
dangerous and/or likely) hazards which warrant further investigation 
• Second, detailed analysis of the most relevant hazards using models focused on the behaviors 
focused on their cause and resulting impact on safety. At this stage, greater statistical 
accuracy (i.e., high confidence in an estimate of their resulting frequency of 'unsafe event') 
can be sought through a higher number of simulation runs. 
Practical Issues with Risk Assessment, and Theory-Based Solutions 
To date, agent-based simulation as a method has focused on the simulation more than the 
analysis; however, as such simulations are enabled, we predict that the data analysis process will 
become the bottleneck. To date, a standard approach to data analysis has included a priori 
design of experiments, many simulation runs then conducted to replicate events of interest, and 
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post hoc data analysis as a separate, subsequent activity to the simulation. In examining this 
process, two effects are noteworthy: 
• First, for NAS risk assessment, efficient, appropriate methods for design of experiments and 
data analysis are not always known ahead of time. For example, safety analysis typically 
entails rare-event analysis - the use of common techniques such as Monte Carlo simulations 
often require a prohibitive number of data runs to create sufficient rare events for analysis, 
suggesting the need for more structured sampling techniques, including mechanisms for 
closed-loop control of the simulator configuration to steer towards data-providing runs. 
• Second, when appropriate data analysis techniques are known, they often follow a standard 
form that can be built into the simulation, mitigating the need for post hoc data analysis. 
However, current techniques need to be adapted to be suitable for built-in data analysis, and 
must be used with an appropriate understanding of their underlying theoretical basis. 
As agent-based simulation becomes commonplace, methods will be needed for rigorously 
planning the test runs and then correctly making statistical inferences from the vast amount of 
data that they can record. These methods need to be able to analyze for rare events with as few 
simulation runs as possible. Preliminary efforts to this end have been made on earlier grants, 
resulting in the architectures shown schematically in Figure 2. 
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OBJECTIVES 
1. Continue to develop agent-based simulation as an effective model of NAS behavior. Specific 
concerns include direct use of human performance models as agents, so that they can be used 
seamlessly in large-scale simulations of the NAS. 
2. Establish a two-stage process which (1) uses high-fidelity models to identify the most relevant 
(i.e., hazardous and/or likely) hazards, and then (2) streamlines the important behaviors into 
agent models suitable for a high number of simulation runs sufficient for statistical confidence in 
output parameters about a risk's frequency and impact when triggered by hazardous conditions. 
3. Establish embedded data analysis and statistical control methods suitable for automatically 
collecting data from the simulations, and for controlling the number and type of simulation runs 
to achieve the desired confidence levels in the output parameters. 
4. Provide the supporting research in statistical techniques and large-scale simulation development 
to enable not only this effort, but broader use of agent-based simulation for risk assessment. 
RESEARCH TASKS 
DEVELOPMENT OF AGENT-BASED SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE AND MODELS SUITABLE FOR LARGE-SCALE 
SIMULATION SUITABLE FOR NAS RISK ASSESSMENT. 
Established methods of agent-based simulation (not only within our project, but also 
within the larger community) have focused more on the agents than on their environment. 
Following an ecological viewpoint of human behavior, we believe that many aspects of human 
performance are driven by the environment and should be represented as such. As such, we 
developed specifications of the constraints and affordances implicit within the environment that 
can establish both a modular software mechanism for codifying environment structures relevant 
to many types of agents and a more-accurate conceptual representation of agent behavior, 
detailed in this section. 
Specifically, the RFS conceptual framework builds on the principles of cognitive 
engineering to describe the components of the work environment, i.e., technology, processes and 
information, and the humans and automation, in task-relevant ways and using a structure-
preserving form using the same attributes and structure as used by system designers and human 
operators. The framework includes both declarative models of system components and their 
interrelations, and computational models of those complex, dynamic behaviors that cannot be 
adequately described declaratively. 
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With this framework, the work environment can be viewed as including all components, 
physical or not, that define, afford or constrain the actions of the humans and automation. Each 
component is defined by three attributes: a set of properties whose values can be accessed <P C > , 
a set of usage mechanisms which can be accessed to use the component to some end <UMC>, and 
internal dynamics ID which can internally change its properties. The properties and usage 
mechanisms can be fully described in the declarative structures, while the internal dynamics are 
captured in software structures suitable for their replication computationally (e.g., a 
computational representation of ordinary differential equations representing aircraft flight 
dynamics) and the appropriate software structure is referenced in the declarative model. 
Unique to this framework, air traffic operating procedures and other 'work processes' can 
be included as components. By defining them as structured orderings of activities, they have 
properties that expose the enclosed procedure and a set of usage mechanisms that specify how 
this component may be used; they do not have any internal dynamic that changes the values of 
its internal properties and thus this one attribute is set to 'NULL' for work process components. 
Further, the work environment is viewed as a multidimensional space where each 
component is mapped onto one or more dimensions, as illustrated in Figure 3. Examining the 
types of human and automation functions germane to this project, (1) functions are directed 
towards achieving some goals, and (2) these functions are 'situated', i.e., their execution is 
contingent to the current state of the work environment. Thus there are two primary 
relationships that should be modeled when modeling work environment of the NAS: (1) the 
functional dimension that relates the components to the goals such that the human and 
automation agents can observe the environment sufficiently well to search for and prioritize 
environment components affording their goals (and that enables formal methods to assemble 
models of the tasks), and (2) the contextual dimension that defines the workspace of the human 
and automation in terms of which components are accessible to them by virtue of their placement 
in the work environment. Unlike current cognitive engineering models, there isn't any 
conceptual limitation on the number of dimensions that can be added into this model of the work 
environment, and there is no limitation on the nature of relationships in any dimension; thus, this 
model form is easily extensible whenever the application requires. As summarized in Table 1, 
components may be summarized also as containing a set of component aspects, with each 
component aspect representing the components' mapping of properties and usage mechanisms 
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onto a dimension of the environment. Thus, the environment model is built 'bottom up' from the 
assemblage of components put into it, and their organization as defined not only by spatial 
properties but also by function allocation between human and automated agents. 
Table 1: Summary of the RFS work environment model 
Model Description 
WE = « C e > , 
< K D e » 
Work environment: The work environment is 
modeled as a collection of all the work-relevant 
components in the system and all the dimensions of 
knowledge of relationships between these components 
that the workers need to accomplish their work. 
KD e = <Rd> Knowledge Dimension: A knowledge dimension 
is a set of work-relevant relationships that associate 
components in the work environment. A knowledge 
dimension includes all instances of these relationships 
and thus establishes one kind of structure or network in 
the work environment. 
Rd = < [ C J , < P I » Work-relevant Relationship: A relationship 
associates components in the work environment in work-
relevant ways. The knowledge-processing engine in the 
worker model is capable of parsing relationships to 
derive the model of a task. 
C e = <IDC, <PC>, 
< U M C » 
C e = <IDC, < C A C » 
Environmental Component: Physical objects, 
processes, technologies, procedures and regulations, 
information and organizational structures that affect 
worker activities. This model contains their internal 
dynamics, work-relevant properties and usage 
mechanisms, which may be grouped by knowledge 
dimension into a set of component aspects. 
CAc = <[P c], 
[UMC]> 
Component Aspect: The component aspect is the 
view of the component from one knowledge dimension. 
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Let us consider Figure 3 to illustrate this framework's utility to analysis of function 
allocation. To identify the impact of particular function allocations between the human air traffic 
controller of sector ZLA-39 and particular automation, each allocation can be represented by 
changing the contextual dimension of the controller and of the automation. In Figure 3, for 
example, the controller's contextual dimension includes the functions of lateral and vertical 
separation via a specified procedure; a different function allocation may put those functions in 
the contextual dimension of an automated system, and replace the controller's radar screen with 
a decision aid. These allocations can be easily and quickly implemented in XML, either by hand 
or by function allocation algorithms. As will be noted later, the software architecture can 
respond in run-time to changes in these models to incorporate dynamic changes to the function 
allocation. 
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Radar Screen 
Lateral Separation Procedure 
Vertical Separation Procedure 
Q= <IDf, <Pr>, <UMC» 
Q= <IDC, <G\>> 
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ion Relevant 
Interface 
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L j 
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u ,..„.„.,.,,., , ,..,...„.„. ,. : ;„;,; „ J 
Figure 3. Describing Two Environment Components and Their Mapping onto the 
Contextual Dimension 
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The models of human and automated agents can be generated from the environment 
model, with the inclusion of representations of human performance where desired. The structure 
of the environment model, i.e., its dimensions and its components, impose certain requirements 
on the agent models: the specification of skills, with associated internal capabilities and 
processors, that the agent must have to be able to successfully interact within their given 
environment (which includes their function allocation). For example, to execute a procedure 
component, the agent must have a corresponding skill, and to use the functional dimension the 
agent must have the skill to parse the dimension and find the components that are affordances to 
their goals. These agent skills can be provided or represented by the AirMIDAS models used 
here in collaboration with San Jose State University, or, when simpler representations of human 
behavior are best suited to the analysis, streamlined models may be used. 
Skills, Capabilities 
and Processors. 
Builds on/ 
references 
references 
Multidimensional 
Environment Model 
Functional 
Dimension 
Contextual 
Dimension 
Some other 
Dimension 
Figure 4. Constructing Human and Automation Agents (Workers) from Skills, Capabilities 
and Processors Referencing the Environment 
This relationship between the environment and agents can be used to computationally 
construct each agent around the skills, capabilities and processors demanded by its work 
environment, and to relate the demands of the environment to the resources available in the 
environment, as illustrated in Figure 4. To examine how an agent model will interact with the 
work environment, consider again the controller of sector ZLA-39 as illustrated in Figure 3 with 
one dimension (contextual dimension) and one component (radar equipment) detailed. The 
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controller agent first interacts with one or more dimensions of the work environment. From 
these dimensions the agent obtains the instances of the relationships that are relevant to his or her 
current work, and then parses these relationships to identify the components that it needs to 
interact with. The aspect that maps the component onto the dimension, for example, the radar 
screen that maps the radar equipment in sector ZLA-39 to the workspace of the sector controller, 
identifies the properties and the usage mechanism, i.e., the interface elements, of the component 
with which the agent interacts. Using his or her knowledge about parsing the relationships on a 
dimension and the general mechanisms to invoke the usage mechanisms on the components, the 
agent is able to successfully interact with the work environment. The invoking of the usage 
mechanisms on the components may trigger their internal dynamics. 
For such interaction between agent and environment, the agent models should be 
equipped with some inference making and problem-solving approach that employs the 
knowledge in each or a combination of dimensions in the work environment model. These 
inference making and problem-solving approaches may be 'hard-wired', as in the case of agent 
models of automated systems, may include simple models of human performance (e.g., 
probabilistic modeling of reaction time with otherwise 'perfect' behavior), or may involve 
sophisticated human performance models. In our case, when detailed representations of human 
performance are warranted we propose using AirMIDAS, developed by NASA Ames Research 
Center (ARC) and San Jose State University (SJSU) primarily for aviation-related 
applications.1 0 , 1 1 This computational human performance model contains several internal 
cognitive behaviors. Mechanistic models of essential psychological and physiological 
phenomenon such as vision, attention, working memory and motor skills capture well-
understood aspects of human behavior. Domain knowledge serves as pre-established knowledge 
about the task, often represented as procedures and a rule-base of goals and processes for core 
tasks. An upgradeable world representation also acquires and maintains knowledge about the 
current state of the environment. Within this framework, a symbolic operator model maintains 
queues of tasks waiting to occur, and switches tasks between them according to knowledge and 
goals. The manner in which these behaviors are assembled can be determined by the selection of 
Cognitive Control Models in response to the demands of the environment. 
These methods and models can be used synergistically for (1) formal analysis and for (2) 
fast-time simulations with computational human performance models capable of predicting and 
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quantifying the performance and safety impacts of changes to the NAS. Computationally 
assembling the declarative representation of all components (including human and automation 
agents), and their dimensions enables automatic generation of a declarative model of the system 
which is too large for unaided analysis by a human but can be formally analyzed by 
computational algorithms for the metrics of interest. To facilitate formal declarative modeling 
and analysis, RFS has established an XML representation for the declarative models, and 
developed a mechanism that then automatically assembles, from the individual components' 
specifications and interrelations, a network model of the entire system in XML which can serve 
to analyze dependencies between components and requirements placed on human and automated 
systems. Such a construction provides a formal method supporting basic modeling and analysis, 
including identifying the extent to which the functions allocated to the humans and automated 
agents contribute to mission requirements, and identifying any issues with resource 
insufficiencys. For example, an environment may require a human to perform a task for which 
they do not have sufficient information, or may imply the human needs to have excessive 
training or extraordinary abilities when compared to a set of known capabilities in current 
operations. Likewise, this formal analysis can generate a 'network' representation of 
dependencies between functions and the environment components they operate upon that is 
potentially useful input to function allocation policies. 
While this formal method can identify those issues apparent from static representations of 
the environment and human and automated agents, many metrics of interest - especially the 
detailed, complex, evolving aspects of system safety - need to be assessed over the course of 
time. Therefore, RFS additionally includes an object-oriented modeling framework in which 
complex, dynamic internal behaviors are each encapsulated as computational objects 
representing the internal dynamics of environment components and the processors (or other 
computational representations) internal to the agents. While these dynamic models need meet 
some interface requirements for the sake of centralized simulation clock control and data passing 
standards, they may internally use any of a wide range of model structures as appropriate. 
The combination of the declarative and computational models also enables computational 
agent-based simulations to predict the dynamic system performance and metrics that will emerge 
when placed in a given scenario. Before and during run-time, the structure of the declarative 
model may be changed; the simulation will automatically update the network model of 
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dependencies and adapt the agents' behaviors accordingly. The agent and environment models 
are represented with sufficient detail that we have already analyzed multi-agent air traffic 
concepts in which constructs such as interruptions, knowledge state, the relative timing of events 
and actions, and workload could be estimated. This task could thus focus on incorporating into 
the RFS and AirMIDAS the ability to formally assemble the models of tasks to derive and record 
the task demands placed on the human. 
The RFS is based on the Reconfigurable Flight Simulator software architecture originally 
designed for HITL flight simulator development and experimentation. This simulation 
platform was constructed using the object-oriented design approach in C++ and provides a fairly 
general and extensible architecture that has since been built on to incorporate novel conceptual 
constructs suitable for complex-agent based simulations. While HITL experimentation is not the 
dominant focus of the proposed work, the RFS can still be run in real-time while interacting with 
human participants, and thus can also provide a seamless link between fast-time computational 
modeling and real-time HITL experimentation-based methods. Additionally, it has built in 
networking features with the demonstrated capability to participate in distributed simulations 
using the High Level Architecture (HLA) networking protocols. 
Test case to serve as a demonstration. 
A test case was used throughout as a basis for developing an agent-based simulation 
including human performance models as agents and for using this simulation for risk assessment. 
Specifically, this test case examined aircraft arrivals into LAX. Several traffic management 
initiatives have been undertaken to increase the capacity of the system while at least maintaining, 
if not improving, the operational safety of the system. For example, Time-Based-Metering is 
one initiative that operationally changes the NAS from distance-based control of spacing in air 
traffic flows to time-based control. 1 3 ' 1 4 This change is enacted through component and network 
level changes in the work-processes in the work environment of air traffic controllers. This 
operational change aims to increase the capacity of the airport in terms of the number of arrivals 
it can accept in any given time. The success of such a work-processes based transformation is 
highly dependent on the successful integration of humans, technology, work-processes and 
information in the system, such as the operational and structural transformations being made to 
the national airspace system.15 Two different cases were examined in this test case: those where 
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controllers are using 'Miles-In-Trail' (MIT) based spacing between aircraft, and those where 
controllers are 'Time-Based Metering' (TMB); however, the purpose of this analysis was not to 
rank one controller method relative to another, but rather to use them collectively to assess the 
most relevant risks involved in these types of operations. It should be noted, that the over­
arching purpose of this work was to provide the research and development base for NAS risk 
assessment, not to provide a single risk assessment of this one test case. 
Investigation into the agents' contributions to risk were be based on behaviors at both the 
system and individual level. Measures of individual behavior focused on a "human-scale" time 
representation (seconds, minutes, hours). System-wide measures follow large-scale response to 
these events over hours to days to months and years, and were defined in terms associated with 
airspace occupancy (arrival rates, time in sector) and dynamics (velocity traces in 4-D 
airspace/time dimensions). In the evaluation of human-system performance and associated 
safety-risk or hazard, both these scales (and other intermediate scales) of behavior must be 
evaluated as to the contribution of those behaviors to some reference level of safety. 
The first task identified the important task descriptions and work processes to include in the 
simulation models, including Conflict Avoidance (CA), Miles-In-Trail (MIT), and Time-Based-
Metering (TBM). Conflict avoidance procedures are used to separate any two aircraft that have 
been detected to possibly come too close to each other in the near future. Such an occurrence of 
the loss of separation is referred to as a 'violation' in this thesis. The MIT procedures are meant 
to space arriving aircraft by a specific in-trail spacing that is expressed in terms of nautical miles 
and is provided to the air traffic controllers by the air traffic management units or is agreed upon 
by controllers of adjoining sectors. These procedures are meant to achieve a specific arrival rate 
while also spacing aircraft to allow for additional aircraft to merge into the stream. The TBM 
procedures are also meant to achieve high arrival rates but operate on the measure of time, where 
desired time of arrival of an aircraft at specific fixes is used as the target to ensure the desired 
arrival rate. To fulfill this task, we worked with SJSU to articulate the specific behaviors of 
interest in the assessment of risk in air traffic control through a series of workshops and 
meetings. We also coordinated with ATAC Corp. on specific airspace attributes of the scenario 
(e.g., aircraft arrival patterns) to properly configure and initialize the scenarios. 
Figure 5illustrates the air traffic control system examined here. It shows the eastern part 
of the airspace for Los Angeles International airport (LAX). This system consists of 
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technological / physical components such as the aircraft (pink dots in figure) that fly through the 
airspace to their respective destination airports. In this case study, all aircraft arriving to LAX 
are termed as arrivals, while all other flights are termed as overflights. The airspace is spatially 
divided into multiple contiguous sectors (ZLA-39, ZLA-37, ZLA-20, ZLA-19, SCT-FDR), 
where the boundaries of these sectors are predefined as abstract polygons in the airspace. The air 
traffic, i.e., all aircraft, in each of these sectors is monitored for conflict-free and procedure-
compliant operation by air traffic controllers, each working on their respective sectors. The air 
traffic controllers are each equipped with a radar screen that displays the traffic in their sector, a 
voice radio to transmit traffic control commands to the aircraft and receive requests from aircraft, 
and a specific set of control procedures. These elements constitute the workspace of the 
controller, with which the controller interacts to achieve his or her goals, i.e., maintain safer 
operations and ensure compliance with assigned procedures. 
ZLA-39 
V 
ZlA-37 
ZLA-19 MIT/IBM 
CA =s Conflict Avoidance 
HIT = Miles-Irt-Trail Metering 
TBM = Time-Based-Metering 
Figure 5: The eastern airspace of the Los Angeles International airport (LAX) 
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This case was sequentially examined in several phases. The first conducted detailed 
simulation runs with RFS linked in run-time to AirMIDAS, each running on distributed 
processors interacting via the HLA distributed simulation protocols. This effort provided initial, 
detailed analysis of potential safety issues, and identified those aspects of behavior most germane 
to further analysis with high numbers of simulation runs. 
The second phase established streamlined 'mini-MIDAS' human performance models 
within RFS, and was used to conduct a large number of simulation runs (over 1 million flight 
hours). This effort involved four researchers (2 at Georgia Tech and 2 at SJSU) dedicated to 
developing and testing the models of both the system and its components, designing the 
experiments, and running the simulations. Additionally, the team was supported by experts in 
the field of modeling and simulation of human performance and air traffic systems. ATAC 
Corp. provided real-world input data and validated the models against observed reality. 
However, this one and a half year effort had limited success in creating validated simulations. 
Examining this phase of effort, significant time was spent on developing the models, 
making them work with each other, and, most significantly, in analyzing the impact of changes 
to the models of the system's components and the system. The model of each system component 
and each agent was implemented in monolithic object-oriented classes where the models of the 
capabilities and skills of the agents and the models of the internal dynamics of environmental 
components were heavily intertwined. There was limited separation between models of 
components, work environment and the workers. As a result, one incremental change in the 
model of any system element could cascade through the system, requiring changes in the models 
of many interacting components. 
The validation efforts in this phase were the least successful on two accounts: 
1. The modeled system manifested two emergent behaviors that are not characteristic of the 
real world system that was being modeled. These behaviors were observed in a majority 
of simulation runs. 
2. Those simulations that did not manifest those problematic emergent behaviors did not 
exhibit performance sufficiently close to the real world data for a third party to validate 
the simulations. The performance was being measured through the use of thirteen 
different system level metrics, such as the number of separation violations in each 
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controlled sector of the airspace, the average distance traveled in each sector and the 
average time taken by the aircraft in each sector. 
There could be a number of causes of these problems. 
1. The input data used to configure the simulations could have errors or biases, 
2. The individual models of the system components may not adequately represent aspects of 
behavior they were intended to represent, 
3. The intended aspects of component behavior described by the models may not have 
included some dynamics critical to emergent system behavior, and 
4. The output data against which the system was being validated could be wrong or biased. 
Though these factors were identified as possible causes during this phase, they could not 
be tested in practical time due to the limitations of the model forms and their implementation in a 
simulation platform. Instead, it was chosen to remodel and re-simulate the system to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the newly-developed conceptual framework and simulation 
architecture in the third and final phase of research on this project. 
The primary challenges for this third phase were to: 
1. Eliminate unwanted and unrealistic emergent behaviors from the simulations, and 
2. Create a valid simulation suitable for safety analysis. 
In trying to meet these challenges, this work demonstrates the conceptual framework and 
simulation architecture by: 
1. Developing this thesis' conceptual framework-based models of the air traffic control 
system, 
2. Explaining emergent behavior through simulation-based evaluation of the set of probable 
causes at the component, network and worker levels by transforming the system's models 
to reflect those changes, and 
3. Demonstrating how different configurations of the NAS could be compared operationally 
using simulation-based analysis, especially with regards to safety analysis. 
The next sections describe themodel of the system and its components, document our 
success in explaining and eliminating the unwanted emergent behaviors, compare arrival 
operations using MIT versus TBM, and finally discussion validation of the system models. 
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Modeling the Arrivals into LAX 
This section discusses a representative set of models from the case study to demonstrate 
how an air traffic system can be simulated in a manner suitable for risk assessment using the 
developments outlined earlier. In the first phases of effort, a number of model specifications 
were elicited from subject matter experts. This knowledge included specifications for 
components of the system work environment and for air traffic controller behavior. Components 
in the work environment included the aircraft, the surveillance and communication equipment 
used by controllers, the physical structure of the airspace as defined by its division into the 
sectors, and the air traffic control procedures (work-processes) used by the controllers (pilots 
were assumed to follow air traffic control clearances exactly, and thus were not modeled in 
detail). The specification of controller behavior included how they prioritize between tasks and 
their limitations believed to be intrinsic to human cognition. Apart from the components of the 
system, the specifications also included knowledge of the structure of the work environment, 
primarily with respect to the physical structure and the contextual structure. These specifications 
were reused for modeling the air traffic management system using this thesis' framework. 
Air Traffic Controller Work-processes 
This section models air traffic control procedures and regulations as work-process 
components of the work environment. The Federal Aviation Administration and collaborating 
agencies develop operational procedures to effectively and efficiently manage air traffic, and 
also develop regulations that the controllers should comply with. In addition, controllers can rely 
upon informal procedures developed and shared within their immediate community. These 
procedures and regulations (work-processes) are a part of the system independent of any 
particular air traffic controller; thus, from an air traffic controller's point of view, these work-
processes are a part of their work environment. These work-processes were modeled as work-
process components of the work environment. 
As discussed in the previous section, a work-process has no internal dynamics, two 
properties (the expression of the situation in which the work-process applies and the process) and 
one usage mechanism. Represented as a nested tuple the conceptual model of the work-process 
component looks like: 
Work-Process = (Null, (Situation, Process), (Procedure-Following-Mechanism)) 
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Figure 6 shows the listing of one such procedure that describes the situation and the 
process' properties in natural language. When computationally represented, this component's 
properties are expressed in XML, including concrete schema specification for representing the 
situation and specific work-process instances (excerpts of the work-process shown in Figure 6 
are shown in their XML specification in Figure 7 and Figure 8). The usage mechanism 
'procedure-following-mechanism' is an algorithm capable of reading these properties, parsing 
them and using them. For example, this mechanism will make sure that the order of the 
activities listed in the process is adhered to. Additionally, this usage mechanism will need to 
access the worker's environmental context to sense the values of the contextual variables that are 
being used in the situation expression and the process, and to take actions in the context. Thus, 
the usage mechanism imposes requirements on the air traffic controller model's access to its 
environmental context. 
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Heading Merge: 
Situation: 
1. A conflict is predicted in the future 
2. The AC have a common waypoint. i.e. their routes merge ahead. 
3. The difference in their heading is more than 15 degrees but less than 135 
degrees. 
Process: 
If conflict time is more than 4 minutes, ahead 
• Spawn Speed control procedure 
If conflict time is more than 2 minutes but less than 4 minutes AND 
-> 
• Vector trailing AC by 15 degrees away from the merge 
• Speed up the leading AC by upto 50 Kts IAS if it is not already on a 
speed increase command ELSE slow down the trailing AC by upto 
50 knots LAS if it is not already on speed reduction command 
• Resume course of vectored AC when appropriate 
• Resume speed of the AC whose speed was commanded when 
appropriate 
If conflict time is less than 2 minutes AND 
Current vertical separation between them is less than a 1000 ft 
-> 
• Climb higher AC by 2000 ft with VS of 2000 FPM 
• Vector trailing AC by 30 degrees away from merge 
• Speed up the leading AC by upto 50 Kts IAS if it is not already on a 
speed increase command ELSE slow down the trailing AC by upto 
50 knots IAS if it is not already on speed reduction command 
• When vertical separation achieved, command altitude altered AC to 
approach target altitude with VS of lower AC 
• Resume course of vectored AC when appropriate 
• Resume flight plan following for AC whose vertical speed was 
altered 
• Resume speed of speed altered AC 
If conflict time is less than 2 minutes AND 
Current vertical separation between them is greater than a 1000 ft 
• Spawn Altitude control procedure 
Figure 6: Natural language listing of the heading merge procedure for conflict avoidance 
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<KB:Object xsi;type-"Proc;typeProcedure* Mame«-wSolvdHeadingMergeB> 
<Proc; Arguments > 
<Proc: Argument xsi:type-"BWT:t ypeNamedOperand" Type-"STRING " 
Name*" [. J FirstACInConf lict" -,!FIRSTAC"/> 
<Proc j Argument xsi i type-"BWT: typeNamedOperand" Type-*STRINGH 
Name- " [. ] SecondACInConflict " ' ="SECONDACn/> 
< / Proc : Argument & > 
<Proc j WorkCondit ion ChecfcCondi 11 onA -" START* EvaluateT©¥alue» " true» 
EvaluateToType-"BOOLEAN"> 
<BWTtExpression xa1;type-"BWT:typeOperator" Name-*&anip;» 
Type-"BOOLEAN" DLL-"" Valu««-""> 
<i-- The given AC must be in c:-nl i i c at time ahead --> 
<BWT:Argument xsi:type-«BWT:typeOperator" Name-"areACInConflict• 
Type««BOOLEAN* DLL-*" Value-""> 
<BWT: Argument xs i : type-"BWT: typeNamedOperand" Name-* (Q>PAJ FIRSTAC" 
Type-* STRING"/> 
<BWT; Argument xs i ; type- " BWT 11ypeNamedOperand« Name-" [©PA] SEQDNDAC" 
Type-"STRING */> 
< / BUT; Argument > 
«J Current heading different* must be greater than 15 degrees --> 
<SWT:Argument xs i t type-"BWT:typeOperator** Same- * &gt; « 
Type-«BOOLEAN* DLL-*« Va1ue»""> 
<BMTjArgument xsi:type-* BWT;t ypeOperator" Name-"tabs* 
Type- " DOUBLE * DLL-" * value-"»» 
<BWT:Argument xsi; type-"BWT ? typeOperator" Name-*-* Type-"DOUBLE" 
DLL-"" value-""> 
< BWT {Argument xs i : type- "BWT: typeNamedOperand" 
Name-" [//] RadarData{ [<&PA] FIRSTAC| STRING}:: PtrHeading_deg» 
Type-"DOUBLE"/> 
<BHT• Argument xs i t type- " BWT s typeNamedOperand* 
Name-"[//]RadarData{[GPA]SECONDAC|STRING}::PtrHeading_deg" 
Type-"DOUBLE"/> 
< / BWT j Argumen t > 
</BWT:Argument > 
<BWT:Argument xsi:type-"BWT:typeValueOperand" Type-"DOUBLE* 
Value-"l5.0*/> 
</BWT:Argument> 
< 1 Current heading diff-erenow must be less than 135 degrees --> 
<BWTjArgument xsi:type-"BWT:typeOperator* Name-"felt;* 
Type-"BOOLEAN" DLL-*" Value«""> 
</BWT\Arg umen t> 
«/BWTjExpression> 
</ProcjWorkCondition> 
ure 7: Partial XML specification of the heading merge procedure shown in Figure 6, 
listing the partial specification of the applicable situation. 
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<KB:Object xsi ; type-*Proc: typeProcedure" \ i . = "SolveHeadirvgMerge" > 
</ProctWorkCondition> 
</Proc:WorkCondi tion> 
<Proc:Process> 
<!-- Define variables --> 
<!-- Start the process with forking a t i o n g ^ t e a r conditional 
resolutions --> 
<Proc:Fork NodelD-"ResolveHeadingMergeK > 
<!-- CGBTFLICTriMEAHEAD > 4 mins, spawn control --> 
<Proc:Choice> 
<l-- ©pacify condition expression --> 
<Proc: Expression EvaluateToValue-"true" Ev-*J uat^ToType-''BOOLEAN" > 
<BWT: Expression xsi : type-"BWT: typeOperator" Name-"&gt; *' 
Type««'BOOLEAN" DLL-"* Value-""> 
<BWT {Argument xs i :type-"BWT: typeNamedOperand" 
Name-"[OTA]CONFLICTTIMEAHEAD" ?yp«-"DOUBLE"/> 
<BWT:Argument xsi :type-"BWT: typeValueOperand" Typ#- "DOUBLE* 
value-*240"/> 
</BWT:£xpression> 
</Proc *Expression> 
< I—Spawn speed control procedure --•> 
«cProc: Spawn ProcedureNatne- " SpeedControl" NodelJD- *' spawnSpdCntrl * 
P ara11el- ntrue"> 
<Proc:Arguments> 
<ProcjArgument xsi:type-"BWT:typeNamedOperand" 
Na«ie-» [SPA] FIRSTAC" Type-"STRING" Argument IlN-"FIRSTAC«/> 
<Proc: Argument xbi stype-HBWT:t ypeNamedOperand" 
Name-* [S&PA] SECONDAC" Type-"STRING" Argument rD=,,SECONDAC" / > 
</Proc:Arguments> 
</Proc:Spawn> 
</Proc tChoi ce> 
</Proc:Fork> 
</Proc:Process> 
</KB:Object> 
Figure 8: Partial XML specification of the heading merge procedure shown in Figure 6, 
listing the partial specification of the process. 
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This demonstration included three work-processes used by the air traffic controller: 
1. Miles-in-trail (MIT): These work-processes help the air traffic controllers space aircraft 
on the same route by a given distance. In real-life the desired distance is provided to the 
controllers by outside traffic management units. 
2. Time-Based-Metering (TBM): In time based metering the Traffic Management Advisor 
(TMA), a technological aid, provides the controllers with 'delay times' that specify when 
each aircraft should arrive over a specific fix. The time-based-metering work-processes 
are meant to help the controller slow and space the aircraft to 'absorb' their delay times. 
3. Conflict Avoidance: These work-processes are meant to help the air traffic controller 
avoid conflicts between aircraft. A conflict is a situation when two aircraft come closer 
than five nautical miles horizontally and one thousand feet vertically above an altitude of 
18,000 feet, and three nautical miles horizontally and one thousand feet vertically below 
18,000 feet. 
The assignment of work-processes to each controller was one way of specifying the 
system's network level structure. For example, when exercising MIT control, the controllers of 
the higher sectors, i.e., ZLA-37, ZLA-39, ZLA-20 and ZLA-19, were given the MIT work-
processes, while the SCT-FDR controller was given the Conflict Avoidance work-processes. On 
the other hand, when exercising TBM control, controllers of sectors ZLA-37 and ZLA-39 were 
given TBM work-processes while the other three were given conflict avoidance work-processes. 
Multidimensional Model of the Work environment 
The system modeled in this demonstration consisted of five air traffic controllers, each 
controlling the airspace in one of the five contiguous sectors on the eastern approach to the Los 
Angeles International Airport (LAX) (Figure 9). There are a number of flights that fly through 
these sectors: some of them are arrivals into LAX (as shown by the red and green lines that 
extend from the right hand side of Figure 9 to the left hand side); others are considered 'over-
flights'. Each sector controller has a display of flights in his or her sector, and a voice radio by 
which he or she issues commands to pilots onboard the aircraft. The controllers have little 
knowledge of the aircraft in other sectors and do not frequently communicate with other 
controllers; therefore, the other controllers and aircraft outside their sector are not considered to 
be in their context. 
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Figure 9: Sectors and arrivals at LAX 
Based on this specification we know that the components in the work environment of the 
air traffic controllers include the aircraft, the surveillance and voice radio equipment and the 
work-processes'. The reader should note that not all these components have the same lifespan as 
the controller: aircraft appear in the work environment according to their schedule and then exit 
the airspace. Thus, this is a dynamic work environment. 
Viewed from top-down, the contextual dimension is constructed by assembling 
contextual nodes for each component of the work-environment and then associating them 
through contextual-compositions. In this case, the contextual dimension includes one contextual 
node for each control sector, which further subsumes the contextual nodes for the surveillance 
equipment, the control equipment, the wind measurement equipment, the work-process 
information system and the flight strips management system (Figure 10). These further subsume 
contextual nodes containing those parts of each component available to the contextual node. 
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Viewed from the bottom-up, the model of each component of the work environment 
includes a set of properties and usage mechanisms. These attributes are grouped into aspects that 
map them onto the contextual dimension of the work environment. 
For example, let us consider the aircraft component. For the purpose of air traffic 
control, the work-relevant properties of the aircraft may be summarized as: 
1. Latitude, 
2. Longitude, 
3. Altitude, 
4. Ground speed, 
5. Vertical speed, 
6. Heading, 
7. Flight Path Angle, and 
8. Flight Plan 
Each aircraft model has a set of contextual aspects that map these attributes onto the 
contextual nodes comprising the contextual dimension. The surveillance equipment includes a 
set of contextual aspects of each aircraft within its monitored airspace through a contextual-
composition relationship. The internal dynamics of the surveillance equipment represents a 
daemon that makes sure that at any given point of time in the simulation the contextual nodes of 
all aircraft in the sector are included in the contextual node of the surveillance object. Similarly, 
contextual nodes are created for flight strips available in the context of a controller (Figure 10). 
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Contextual 
Dimension 
1 3 
Sector Sector Sector '. Sector Sector 
(SCT-FDR) (ZLA19) (ZLA20) (ZLA37) ; (ZLA39) 
Surveillance Voice Radio Flight Strips Wind 
Measurement t t 
AC Aq 
t Latitude, 
2. Longitude, 
3. Altitude, 
4. Ground speed, 
5 Vertical speed, 
6. Heading, 
7, Flight Path Angle 
1. Change speed, 
2. Change altitude with vertical speed, 
3. Fly to heading, 
4. Resume course, 
5. Resume speed 
Figure 10: Part of the contextual dimension in the case study 
The usage mechanisms of an aircraft include: 
1. Change speed, 
2. Change altitude with vertical speed, 
3. Fly to heading, 
4. Resume course, and 
5. Resume speed. 
In the real world, these usage mechanisms are available to the pilot through controls in 
the cockpit or through flight management systems. For example, pilots tune their 
communication equipment to the frequency assigned to the control sector that they are flying 
through and thus come into the contextual dimension of the controller, where they can be given 
commands by the controller. In this case study, these pilot-controller communication 
mechanisms were assumed not to be important for the analysis and these usage mechanisms are 
directly made available in the context of a controller by mapping them over to their contextual 
dimension through their voice radio equipment. 
The functional dimension relates the environmental components to the goals through 
means-ends-constraints relationships; in other words, it identifies them as affordances and 
constraints towards one or more goals. The construction of the functional dimensions starts with 
identification of the goals (Figure 11). 
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Enforce MIT Restrictions k 
Enforce TBM Restrictions 
Apply Vertical Separation 
Apply Speed Resolution 
Apply Vectoring Resolution 
Apply Altitude Merge Resolution 
Apply Close Conflict Resolution 
Avoid Conflicts ph Complete Flight Plan of Aircraft •* 
Adhere to Flight Plan 
Goals 
Resume Course 
Separate AC by X miles 
Work-Processes 
Figure 11: Relating goals and work-processes via the functional dimension 
Once the goals have been identified, the environmental components are tagged as means 
and constraints. In this case we have two kinds of environmental components: technological 
artifacts and work-processes. For the sake of brevity of this discussion, Figure 11 shows a partial 
model including only the goals and the work-processes; the artifacts are included in the full 
model in an identical manner as the work-processes. In the figure, the associations with 
arrowheads identify that the component at the tail of the arrow is a means to the work-objective 
at the head of the arrow. If the arrowhead is a dot, it identifies the component at the tail of the 
arrow as a constraint. 
Environment-Centered Construction of Agents 
In this section, models of the air traffic controllers are automatically generated from the 
work environment model and the assignment of goals and context to workers. Air traffic 
controllers are the only workers modeled here. There are five of these workers, one for each of 
the control sectors. They are each allotted to a specific sector in the contextual dimension 
(Figure 10), thus making the appropriate contextual node (and any it subsumes) available to each 
controller. They are each allotted a subset of goals from the set shown in Figure 11. For 
instance, when the system design represents an MIT configuration, the air traffic controller for 
sector ZLA19 (one of the four higher sectors that enforce MIT restrictions between arrivals) is 
allotted the following objectives: Enforce MIT Restrictions, and Complete Flight Plan of 
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Aircraft. For an environment-centered design, making these allotments is the only activity 
required when designing the system. 
However, an agent also needs to be constructed as a configuration of skills, capabilities 
and processors. This thesis' simulation platform is capable of building the agent based on the 
system-level design. Specifically, using the model composition architecture discussed earlier, 
the model construction engine first identifies all environmental components associated with the 
allotted goals on the functional dimension and with all components in the contextual dimension 
that are associated with the allotted context of the worker. The usage mechanisms of these 
components are identified and the skills and capabilities associated with them are picked out 
from the computational model registry and added onto either an empty agent model or to a 
template agent model which may be hand-picked by the designer. When a template model is 
picked by the designer, the model construction engine identifies those skill and capability 
implementations from the computational model registry that correspond to the template. These 
skills and capabilities are then aggregated into the agent. At this point the agent model is ready 
to be used in the simulation for operational analysis; in addition, the assembled list of skills and 
capabilities can be examined during network analysis to examine the feasibility of the set for the 
intended worker and to identify training and information requirements for the worker. 
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Table 2 shows the full set of skills and capabilities in the controller for sector ZLA-39 when 
given MIT procedures. Each of these skills and capabilities was coded using C++ into facets that 
can be aggregated into the agent model. 
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Table 2: The full set of skills and capabilities of the controller of sector ZLA-39 when given 
MIT procedures 
Skill Name Skill Description 
1 AreACInConflict Check if two aircraft are in conflict 
2 GetlfCommonWaypoint Check if two aircraft have a common 
waypoint 
3 GetDistanceBtPts Get horizontal distance between two 
points 
4 GetHdgBtPts Get heading between two waypoints, as 
measured from the North 
5 GetlfFailedResolution Makes sure if a particular resolution failed 
for given aircraft in a given conflict 
6 IsPointlnSector Check if a given point is in sector 
7 GetDstncToMergePoint Calculate the distance between an 
aircraft's current position and the merge point of 
that aircraft and another aircraft. 
8 GetHdgFromMergePoint Get the orientation of an aircraft from the 
merge point of that aircraft and another aircraft 
9 ChangeSpeed Command a given aircraft to change speed 
10 ChangeAltWithVS Command a given aircraft to change 
altitude with a given vertical speed 
11 ChangeHeading Command a given aircraft to change 
heading to a given heading 
12 ResumeCourse Command an aircraft to resume course 
13 ResumeSpeed Command an aircraft to resume waypoint 
speed 
14 ResumeAltitude Command an aircraft to meet waypoint 
altitude restriction 
15 Wait Wait for a given amount of time 
16 GetDoubleProperty Read a variable from the context 
17 GetFlightPlan Read flight plan of a given aircraft from 
the context 
18 MonitorConformance Monitor boundary conformance for all 
aircraft sent off-course by the controller 
19 MonitorTraffic Monitor traffic in sector for possible 
conflicts 
20 IsChangeConflictFree Judge if a particular maneuver for a 
particular aircraft would be conflict free in given 
time frame 
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21 CalculateLatLongAltAtTimeAheac I Calculate the position of an aircraft in 
given future time 
22 IsACReadyToResumeAlt Make sure that the aircraft can resume 
altitude without creating future conflicts 
23 IsACReadyToResumeSpeed Make sure that the aircraft can resume speed 
without creating future conflicts 
24 IsACReadyToResumeHeading Make sure that the aircraft can resume 
course in two dimensions (not vertically) without 
creating future conflicts 
25 IsACReadyToResumeCourse Make sure that the aircraft can resume 
three-dimensional course without creating future 
conflicts 
26 IsACOnAltChange Check if the aircraft has been commanded 
altitude changes 
27 IsACOnHeadingChange Check if the aircraft has been sent off-
course 
28 IsACOnSpeedChange Check if the aircraft has been commanded 
to change speed 
29 MonitorMITTraffic Monitor arrivals for in-trail spacing 
violations 
30 IsACInMITViolation Check if a particular aircraft is closer to any 
other arriving aircraft than the required in-trail 
spacing 
31 GetViolationDistance Calculate the distance that a particular 
aircraft will have to absorb to avoid in-trail 
separation violation 
32 GetDistanceToDestination Calculate aircrafts along track distance from 
destination 
33 GetHeadingFromDestination Calculate orientation of a given aircraft 
from the destination 
34 IsPastlLSMerge Calculate if an arrival aircraft is past the ILS 
merge point for the destination 
35 GetHeadingFromlLSMerge Calculate the orientation of the aircraft from 
the ILS merge 
36 GetDistanceToILSMerge Calculate the along track distance of an 
aircraft from the ILS merge point 
37 GetConflictTimeAhead Calculate time to conflict 
38 FollowProcedures Follow the procedures in the context 
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The agent models were constructed from the template for the rudimentary human 
performance model described earlier. This template was populated with the skills and 
capabilities that are specifically needed of an air traffic controller based on the specifications just 
discussed. Except when a worker-level transformation was examined, the activity parameters 
were as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Specification of activity parameters for the air traffic controller model 
Agent Type L i m i t e d re'sourVks^^^S^BSW^"'"' 
Source of Variability Duration Accuracy # Resources 
Resource Acquisition 
Priority Rating 
Distribution Normal Uniform Normal 
Activity Mean Stdev Probability Mean Stdev 
Monitor Traffic for Conflicts 6 4 0.8 3 ! 5 
Monitor Traffic for MIT Spacing 3 2 0.8 3 ! 4 
Monitor Traffic for TBM Compliance 3 2 N/A 2 1 4 
Change Speed OS 2 N/A 4 ! 8 
Change Heading 6 2 N/A 4 1 8 
Change Altitude 6 2 N/A 4 ! 8 
Resume Course 3 1 N/A 4 oo 
Resume Speed 3 1 N/A 4 8 
Monitor Sector Boundary Conformance 2 6 N/A 2 ! 10 
Wait Var 5 N/A 1 1 1 
Follow Procedures Unlimited N/A 2 2 1 
Explaining Emergent Behaviors 
This section demonstrates how the two unrealistic emergent behaviors observed in the 
previous phases were explained and, through use of simulation of the models, used to correct the 
models: 
1. Occurrences of unplanned steep descents in flight paths, and 
2. Occurrences of unplanned horizontal "loops" in flight paths. 
These emergent behaviors could arise from either the aircraft or the controller behaviors, 
mismatched or untimely interaction between the two, the work-process specifications, or a 
combination of these factors. Since the previous modeling architecture was not well suited to 
quick modifications of its models of environment components and agent behaviors, exploring the 
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full set of possible changes to the models would have required significant software modification 
and a prohibitive duration of development time. 
Once the system was modeled using this framework and implemented over the software 
and simulation architecture, the level of effort to test several design variables was significantly 
reduced and a sufficient range of conditions was examined to not only explain the causes of 
those emergent behaviors but also eliminate them in the simulation, as described in the following 
sub-sections. 
Explaining Steep Descents 
The altitude profiles of arrivals using the previous simulation are shown in Figure 12. It 
was observed in the previous simulation that to avoid conflicts some aircraft would be 
commanded to either hold altitude or climb to higher altitudes, and then later be commanded to 
resume course and meet waypoint altitude restrictions. In such situations, the aircraft would 
sometimes exhibit steep descents. Approximately 98% of the 11,200 simulation runs, each with 
approximately two hour of simulated time and an average of approximately 28 arrivals per 
simulation, manifested this behavior for one or more aircraft irrespective of which procedures 
(MIT or TBM) were in place. 
As a first step in finding the source of and eliminating these unwanted emergent 
behaviors, the internal dynamics of aircraft were modified to have internal limits on their descent 
rates. Changing the system model for such a component level transformation in the system was 
as simple as replacing the facet that models the basic flight dynamics on the aircraft model with a 
new facet that enforces limits on behavior. Although this change corrected the problem of steep 
descents, it resulted in the aircraft not being able to meet their altitude restrictions (Figure 13), 
another unrealistic emergent behavior. In addition, the traffic flow within the airspace changed 
in a direction that led to too many conflicts and too many altitude hold commands. This 
component level transformation was therefore discarded as a possible candidate for eliminating 
the unwanted emergent behavior. 
Distance From Runway 
Figure 13: Vertical profile for arrivals when limits on vertical speeds were encoded in 
aircraft internal dynamics 
Since transforming aircraft behavior was not the correct solution to the problem, the next 
step examined transformations in work-processes. As shown in Figure 12, the aircraft were 
commanded to hold altitude in order to avoid conflicts. As a result, the aircraft drew close to 
their next horizontal waypoint while staying at a much higher altitude. Thus, when commanded 
to resume course and meet the altitude restriction of their next waypoint, they tended to exhibit 
very steep descents. This observation was used to transform the work-processes to not hold 
aircraft at the same altitude for very long, but instead descend aircraft at fixed vertical speeds as 
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soon as they are vertically separated (Figure 14). The overall system performance in terms of 
separation violations and number of occurrences of steep descents improved with such a change: 
although the aircraft continued to sometimes exhibit descents at a high rate, these descents were 
not as drastic and as frequent as before. Examining the recorded behaviors found the remaining 
steep descents occurred when the aircraft were commanded to descend at the given vertical speed 
at lower altitudes where the true air speeds are lower. Modifying the work-processes further to 
schedule the commanded vertical speed by altitude resulted in reduction of steep descents from 
occurring in 98% of simulations to 0.3% (Figure 14), while also improving system performance 
in terms of reducing the number of violations recorded per run and the number of total diversions 
from planned flight paths of aircraft. Figure 15shows the output of one simulation where one 
flight was held at a given altitude but, when later brought back on course, its rate of descent was 
within tolerance. 
The effort involved in making these component level transformations in the work-
processes was as little as changing its XML representation of which components to include and 
modifying isolated models of activities, without any cascading interactions between the various 
component and agent models. 
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Process to vertically separate two arrivals 
(a) Hold altitude of higher aircraft 
(b) Recheck every 30 seconds if resuming course is conflict free 
(c) Resume course when appropriate 
Transformed process to vertically separate two arrivals 
(a) Hold altitude of higher aircraft until vertical separation is achieved 
(b) Once separated vertically, descend higher aircraft to next waypoint altitude at vertical 
speeds less than that of lower aircraft. When assigning vertical speed, compensate for 
the following 
(1) If true airspeed of aircraft is greater than 250 knots, assign 2000 feet per minute 
(2) If true airspeed of aircraft is less than 250 knots, assign 1500 feet per minute 
(c) Recheck every 30 seconds if resuming course is conflict free 
(d) Resume course when appropriate 
Figure 14: Vertical separation procedures before and after transformation 
Resume Course issued 
• 
Distance From Runway 
Figure 15: Vertical profile of arrivals when air traffic controller work-processes were 
changed to not command high vertical speeds 
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Explaining Loops 
It was observed in the previous modeling effort that, to avoid conflicts, some aircraft 
were vectored off their routes and then be commanded to resume course. In such situations the 
aircraft would sometimes exhibit a "horizontal looping" behavior (Figure 16) where the aircraft 
turns back to the waypoint it was originally enroute to. Approximately 51% of the 11,200 
simulation runs manifested this behavior. 
Figure 16: Horizontal profile of arrivals in previous simulation exhibiting the horizontal 
looping behavior 
Similar to the case of steep descents, any of the aircraft and controller behavior and the 
work-processes models could account for such a behavior. Each one of these possible causes 
were examined. Examination of the event logs showed that the aircraft, when commanded to 
resume course after the earlier deviation from it, resumed their path to the waypoint that they 
were enroute to before they were vectored off. If that waypoint was now behind them they had 
to horizontally loop back to reach it. This was obviously a mismatch between the internal 
dynamics in the flight management system (FMS) of the aircraft and the expectations implicit in 
the controller's command to resume course. Figure 17 illustrates the internal mechanism of the 
aircraft's model of its FMS. The pink tag on the usage mechanism of the aircraft that is used to 
command the aircraft to vector off route at a given heading invokes the heading override 
behavior in the internal dynamics of the aircraft. This event-based (responsive) behavior further 
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changes the aircraft's autonomous waypoint following behavior to steer it off the route. When a 
resume course command is issued through the use of the corresponding usage mechanism 
(identified by the green tag), it invokes a course-resumption behavior in the internal dynamics 
that again affects the autonomous waypoint following behavior of the aircraft. It was noted that 
the previous model's course-resumption behavior always reverted to the waypoint before the off-
route deflection. On the other hand, the controller assumed that the aircraft would resume course 
towards the next waypoint in its flight plan that has a bearing between +90 degrees and -90 
degrees relative to its current heading, without the controller needing to explicitly direct the 
aircraft to this new waypoint. 
[speed Override Behavior 
Heading Override Behavior 
Course Resumption Behavior 
Usage Mechanisms 
I^ Change'speed 
Figure 17: Illustration of the internal mechanism of the aircraft model that leads to 
horizontal looping behavior 
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In order to test this hypothesis, a component level transformation was introduced in the 
system through changing the course resumption behavior in the internal dynamics of the aircraft 
model to match the assumptions of the controller. Using the architecture of this thesis, this 
transformation was easily introduced by simply replacing the facet that implemented the course 
resumption behavior, within the internal dynamics of the aircraft, with a new one that exhibited 
the desired FMS characteristics. Due to the modular nature of the model elements, this change 
did not require any concomitant changes in any other elements of the aircraft or the system 
models. Furthermore, this component level change completely eliminated the "horizontal loop" 
(Figure 18), thus also explaining the cause of this unwanted emergent behavior. 
Longitude 
Figure 18: Horizontal profile of arrivals with the changed internal dynamics of the flight 
management system of aircraft 
The time and effort spent in this phase was far less compared to the prohibitive 
development time required in the previous phases. Using this project's conceptual framework 
and simulation platform, once the basic modeling constructs for the domain had been created, it 
took one researcher less than one week to test the intuitions, i.e., create new models for 
component internal dynamics or agent behavior (through the use of facets specific to those 
behaviors), run a number of simulations to analyze behavior, and feed back the changes in the 
models. This exercise demonstrates the ease, flexibility and efficiency of using this project's 
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conceptual and practical constructs in explaining emergent behavior and testing different design 
alternatives through the use of component level transformations. 
Figure 19 and Figure 20compare the previous model's performance with that of this 
thesis' model after correcting the unrealistic emergent behaviors. The graphs show the number 
of times aircraft got too close to each other ("violations") in each of the five sectors for each of 
the four scenarios (i.e., different arrival streams in different wind conditions) in both the MIT 
and the TBM work-processes. The graphs clearly show an improvement in performance as 
measured by a reduction in the number of violations. 
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Analyzing Configurations of and Changes to Air Traffic Systems 
This section describes two additional analyses of transformations to this air traffic control 
system. A network level transformation in the work environment is exercised through changing 
the set of work-processes available to each air traffic controller, including MIT versus TBM as 
well as examining the implications of extra conflict avoidance procedures. The impact of 
estimated human performance parameters were also examined. 
In the MIT configuration, the controllers of the four higher-altitude sectors (ZLA-39, 
ZLA-37, ZLA-20 and ZLA-19) use procedures for distance-based separation between aircraft 
(MIT procedures) which help them issue air traffic clearances to ensure that no two aircraft come 
closer than the desired in-trail spacing. The air traffic controllers' primary goal was to enforce 
this MIT restriction and make sure that each aircraft was resumed on its course before it left their 
sector, if they had earlier deviated it off course. The prior phases had assumed this was the only 
work-process stipulated to the controllers of these sectors. 
In the transformed work environment, each controller was provided with an additional set 
of work-processes, the conflict avoidance procedures, which are meant to additionally prevent 
separation violations. To transform the system in this way, the only changes in the system model 
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were (1) to change the goal assignment of the controllers (workers) of the ZLA sectors to also 
include violation prevention and (2) to add these procedures in the contextual dimension to the 
context of the ZLA sector controllers. The functional dimension did not need any changes 
because the procedures already existed in the system for the SCT sector and thus were already 
associated by means-ends-constraints relationships with the goals. Once these changes were 
made in the declarative model, i.e., the XML representation of the contextual dimension, the 
system and agent construction architecture automatically constructed the computational models 
needed for the simulation. The agent models did not have to change because they were already 
capable of processing whatever set of work-processes is assigned to them. 
Figure 21 compares the performance of the new design alternative with the existing 
system in terms of the number of separation violations found in each sector over multiple runs in 
several scenarios. Though performance is improved for the new design alternative, i.e., the 
average number of violations is reduced, these results could not be compared with reality due to 
lack of data. 
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Figure 21: Comparison of average number of separation violations per sector per scenario 
for changes in the changes in air traffic procedures 
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To assess the effectiveness of the procedures by themselves in controlling the airspace 
relative to important considerations in human performance, the human performance model was 
replaced with a worker model with resource limits and without any stochastically induced 
inaccuracies in its activities in terms of the probability of detecting a conflict or a spacing 
problem in every scan of the radar display (Table 4). This transformation was enacted using the 
same declarative model of the worker by simply (1) replacing the reference in declarative model 
to the facet for the original resource provider with a modified version that did not limit resources 
and (2) replaced the reference in the declarative model to the facets for the activities involving 
inaccuracies to slightly modified facets which did not have inaccuracies. Rerunning the model 
constructor on the new declarative model of the system created the computational model of the 
transformed worker and the system. 
Table 4: Summary of worker-level transformation in air traffic controller model 
Agent Type 
Limited resources (Max 
3
 Resources = 7) 
Source of Variability Accuracy Accuracy # Resources 
Distribution Uniform Uniform Normal 
Activity Probability Probability Mean Stdev 
Monitor Traffic for Conflicts 1 0.8 3 1 
Monitor Traffic for MIT Spacing 1 0.8 3 1 
Monitor Traffic for TBM Compliance N/A N/A 2 1 
Change Speed N/A N/A 4 1 
Change Heading N/A N/A 4 1 
Change Altitude N/A N/A 4 1 
Resume Course N/A N/A 4 1 
Resume Speed N/A N/A 4 1 
Monitor Sector Boundary Conformance N/A N/A 2 1 
Wait N/A N/A 1 1 
Follow Procedures N/A N/A 2 1 
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Simulations for the same scenarios as before yielded the results shown in Figure 22. The 
improvement in performance (i.e., reduction in violations) was expected due to increased 
accuracy and improved response time of the worker. As before, this one cannot be validated 
since the real air traffic system is always operated by resource constrained controllers, but this 
exercise does demonstrate the ease with which the impact of various human performance 
parameters can be examined during risk assessment. 
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Figure 22: Comparison of average number of separation violations per sector per scenario 
for changes in worker models 
In terms of efficiency it took one researcher about two days to enact the worker level 
transformation, configure and run 40 simulations for each scenario on each of eight different 
machines, post process the data, and analyze it. It took about three days to do the same for 
worker level transformations. This level of effort is sufficiently low as to motivate such analyses 
as a regular, integral part of risk assessment of air traffic systems. 
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Validating System Models 
This section discusses this project's efforts to validate the simulation. One of the 
challenges posed before was to create a valid simulation, or to identify causes of discrepancies 
between simulation behavior and output data that go beyond the scope of the modeling and 
simulation capability. From the simulation results shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24we can see 
that the number of violations in the simulated system is greater than the recorded radar data. In 
fact, this number of violations would in reality be considered unsafe. To statistically compare 
the simulation output with observed data from the real system, t-tests were performed between 
the metrics from the radar data and the simulated system. For more than half of the thirteen 
metrics collected for each sector the t-tests found significant differences between the outputs 
from the simulation and the radar data. Thus validation of the modeled system failed, both for 
the previous simulation that had unrealistic emergent behaviors in flight profiles and for that 
developed in this thesis. 
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Figure 23: Comparison of average number of separation violations for simulations and the 
observed radar data for MIT scenarios 
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recorded radar data for TBM scenarios 
As discussed early, there could be a number of causes of these failures: 
1. The input data used to configure the simulations could have errors or biases: Most 
elements of the input data were crosschecked with a third party and found to be correct. 
However, with regards to the inputs provided for delay times associated with each aircraft 
in TBM operations, two problems were found. First, some of the times were sufficiently 
small that the aircraft could not meet them without an unrealistic increase in speed during 
a phase of flight where their speed should be reduced in preparation for landing. Second, 
some of the delay times required aircraft to get sufficiently close that they created 
separation violations. These delay times were provided by a third party as input data for 
these simulations. As such, it was impossible for this thesis' research to identify whether 
the problems with this input data reflect poor representation by the third party of the 
output of TMA system that generates them, or whether the TMA system itself is prone to 
these issues. However, a crosscheck by this third party with radar observations of the 
real system showed changes in the flight profiles of the aircraft found to have difficulty 
with delay times in the simulation, suggesting that controllers need to perform more than 
just the prescribed TBM work-processes for the delay times to be met. 
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2. The individual models of the system components may not adequately represent aspects of 
behavior they were intended to represent. Each individual component was therefore 
checked for adequate representation of intended aspects of behavior and was found to be 
valid for the given specifications. Most of these individual models had been validated 
during previous simulation developments. For example, the winds calculated by the 
simulated wind model were compared against radar data through the use of paired t-tests 
and were found to have similar distributions. The aircraft models were validated in terms 
of their ability to meet their waypoint restrictions both in terms of their spatial constraints 
and in terms of speeds, and their speed profiles had been verified. Furthermore, these 
models had previously been used in other successful research, thus lending further 
credibility to their correctness. Thus, there was reasonable confidence in the validity of 
individual models of system components. 
3. The intended aspects of component behavior described by the models may not have 
included some dynamics critical to emergent system behavior. A few conversations with 
subject matter experts revealed that there may have been some un-modeled dynamics. 
Specifically, there is a significant level of communication and coordination between the 
controllers in the use of both MIT and TBM procedures, but this communication had not 
been specified when preparing the model specifications and therefore had not been 
modeled. In case of MIT they have letters of agreement between contiguous sectors that 
specify the exact miles-in-trail restriction which may not be fully represented in the 
model specifications. In case of TBM there is also evidence of significant coordination 
and communication amongst controllers to exercise the TBM restrictions. These 
explorations suggest the likelihood of un-modeled dynamics beyond those the models 
were intended to cover. Such behavior could be attributed to the creativity of and 
learning by air traffic controllers, or to commonplace but undocumented practices. 
4. The output data against which the system was being validated could be wrong or biased: 
In addition, simulation runs identified some apparent biases in the data about real system 
behavior provided by a third party for simulation validation. Figure 25and Figure 
26compare the average distance-in-sector validation measures with those recorded by the 
simulations. As the graphs show, for MIT there is negative bias in sectors ZLA19 and 
ZLA20 and positive bias in sectors ZLA37 and ZLA39. The measured values are 
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different by about 12 miles: radar data records a value of approximately 20 miles, but 
simulated data records a value of nearly 32 miles, an increase of 60%. Examining the 
profiles of the planned routes (profiles obtained by drawing straight lines through the 
sectors) it became evident that in reality the aircraft could not have taken such short 
routes. Likewise, examining the simulated aircraft profiles, most of the aircraft were not 
diverted by the controller from their flight plan; the few that were diverted did not divert 
so far as to increase the average distance of flight of all aircraft by 60%. As a further test, 
since the number of vectoring commands given in the simulation is significantly small, 
the average distance-in-sector for flight paths when there is no control by air traffic 
controllers (i.e., simulating whence the aircraft coast down their flight path) should 
dominate this measure. As shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26 the simulated data for both 
the previous and this thesis' simulation is dominated by the no-air-traffic-control scenario 
as expected. A similar issue manifested in the TBM validation data. Finally, the average 
total-flight-distance (i.e., the total distance flown by each aircraft through all sectors it 
traverses during arrival) is almost the same between simulations and validation models, 
suggesting the radar data intended for validation may have been systematically biased 
high in sectors ZLA37 and ZLA39, and low in sectors ZLA19 and ZLA20. 
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Figure 25: Bias in MIT validation data 
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Figure 26: Bias in TBM validation data 
Issues in Efficiency of Model Development and Risk Assessment 
This section compares the modeling and simulation efforts in modeling the air traffic 
control system using this thesis' conceptual framework and simulation platform and the previous 
simulation. The previous modeling, simulation and analysis effort was spread out over a span of 
about one and half year, which is significantly large compared to this thesis' three and a half 
month effort. Table 5 compares the total efforts in modeling and in simulation and analysis. The 
modeling effort includes: conceptual modeling, development of computational models, 
troubleshooting, debugging and model verification. The simulation and analysis effort include: 
modification of models for testing transformations, configuring simulations, conducting 
simulations, and analyzing their results. 
Table 5: Comparison of estimated modeling and analysis efforts (man-months) 
Earlier Phases Final Phase 
17.5 1.75 
Simulation and Analysis 16 1 
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This final phase of the project definitely required significantly less time and effort, and 
was able to explore more model settings and system configurations than earlier. We mostly 
attribute this gain in efficiency to the ability to model the system in a structure-preserving 
manner, thus being able to make and test transformations much quicker. However, some 
exogenous factors should be noted. First, there was learning from the earlier phases. Second, 
some of the models and analysis capabilities developed in the earlier phases were available for 
this final phase's effort; attempts to exclude their development time from the time estimates for 
the previous simulation were conducted in good faith but required subjective assessments. 
Summary 
This demonstration highlighted the ability to model socio-technical systems in a 
structure-preserving manner, explain and predict their emergent behavior, and compare 
performance of different system design alternatives transformed through component, worker and 
network level changes. These developments provide detailed representations of system behavior 
and human performance suitable for risk assessment. This demonstration employed a case study 
in modeling and simulating the air traffic control system at the Los Angeles International Airport 
(LAX). Using this conceptual framework and simulation platform it is possible to transform a 
system at each of the component, network and worker levels. Likewise, there are significant 
gains in ease and efficiency in modeling and simulating a socio-technical system using the 
conceptual framework and simulation platform developed in this project. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS 
The primary, intended contributions of this research focused on expanding the application 
and feasibility of agent-based simulation of the NAS for safety analysis. In addition, as shown 
below in Table 1, these developments have several likely side effects for theory and for practice. 
Likewise, these research efforts are intended to support safety analysis of the NAS using 
agent-based simulation. However, these developments may also have broader applicability. For 
example, other data sets describing NAS behavior may be available which can be analyzed or 
data-mined using the same data analysis methods as described here. The use of agent-based 
simulation to describe and analyze other aspects of NAS performance may be demonstrated. 
Likewise, these mechanisms and statistical methods may also be applicable to other large-scale, 
distributed systems. 
Table 1: Primary Contributions and Likely Side Effects of the Proposed Effort 
Primary Contributions Likely Side Effects 
Use of agent-based simulation, integrating 
human performance models into a larger 
simulated environmental context, with output 
suitable for guiding subsequent hazard analysis 
and risk assessment processes. 
Improved human performance modeling due to 
the ability to place human behavior in a larger 
environment context with interactions with 
other agents. 
Improved methods of representing the 
environmental context of and interactions 
between agents in large-scale simulations. 
Improved methods of timing agent interactions 
within and across processors, for better 
computational efficiency and tighter 
integration with the temporal dynamics within 
complex agent models. 
Use of agent-based simulation in a multi-stage 
process which progressively streamlines and 
focuses the simulations on situations and 
conditions requiring risk assessment, resulting 
in estimates of the impact of identified hazards. 
Procedures for rare-event analysis, suitable for 
data-mining other similar 'messy' data sets 
Compact models of high-level NAS behavior 
suitable for high number simulation runs for 
fast-time analyses. 
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